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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
to hear this Appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) 
and § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In 1985, the Division of State Lands and Forestry (the 
"Division") demanded that Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail 
Mountain") retroactively pay royalties under State Coal Lease 
No. 22603 (the "Lease") at the rate of 8% of the value of coal 
sold. The Division also demanded significant interest and 
penalties for the alleged underpayment of royalties during the 
period from 1979 through 1985. Trail Mountain filed a 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against the defendants 
(hereinafter collectively the "State") challenging the State's 
demand for retroactive payment of royalties. Each party filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment based on extensive stipulated 
facts. The Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery County, 
Bunnell, J., granted Trail Mountain's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against the State. The State appeals the Judgment of 
the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The dispositive issues presented for review on this 
appeal are as followsr1 
1. Whether the royalty provision in the Lease is 
ambiguous? 
2. Whether the royalty provision regarding payment 
of an alternate royalty amount is self-executing? 
3. Whether the royalty provision should be enforced 
in accordance with the parties1 past interpretation and course 
of conduct? 
4. Whether the District Court properly considered 
the law regarding school trust lands in entering its Judgment? 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Enabling Act § 10: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted 
for educational purposes, except as 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Trail Mountain submits its own Statement of Issues 
In view of the fact that the State has not assigned 
error to the District Court's decision regarding interest and 
penalties, Trail Mountain will not address that issue. The 
District Court held that "the State had no right under the Lease 
to impose interest, except on delinquent payments at the legal 
rate, or any penalty. A legally binding lease cannot be altered 
or added to by by [sic] rules and regulations adopted 
subsequently." (R. 657-658) 
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hereinafter otherwise provided, shall 
constitute a permanent school fund, the 
interest of which only shall be expended for 
the support of said schools, and such land 
shall not be subject to pre-emption, 
homestead entry, or any other entry under 
the land laws of the United States, whether 
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be 
surveyed for school purposes only. 
Utah Constitution, Article XX, § 1: 
All lands of the State that have been, or 
may hereafter be granted to the State by 
Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, 
grant or devise, from any person or 
corporation, or that may otherwise be 
acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared 
to be the public lands of the State; and 
shall be held in trust for the people, to be 
disposed of as may be provided by law, for 
the respective purposes for which they have 
been or may be granted, donated, devised or 
otherwise acquired. 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-7-406: 
With respect to a third person dealing with 
a trustee or assisting a trustee in the 
conduct of a transaction, the existence of 
trust power and their proper exercise by the 
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The 
third person is not bound to inquire whether 
the trustee has power to act or is properly 
exercising the power; and a third person, 
without actual knowledge that the trustee is 
exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in 
dealing with the trustee as if the trustee 
possessed and properly exercised the powers 
he purports to exercise. A third person is 
not bound to assure the proper application 
of trust assets paid or delivered to the 
trustee. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trail Mountain and its predecessors mined coal under 
the Lease during the period from 1979 through 1985. 
(R. 669,672) The State furnished Trail Mountain a blank 
printed form entitled Coal Production and Settlement 
Transmittal on which to report quarterly production 
information, royalty rate, and certain other information, and 
upon which to calculate the amount of royalty payable to the 
State. (R. 675-676) Each Coal Production and Settlement 
Transmittal submitted during the period, plus each royalty 
check or check stub, reflected that royalties were calculated 
and paid by Trail Mountain at the rate of 15?5 per ton. (R. 
676) Each Coal Production and Settlement Transmittal submitted 
by Trail Mountain from 1979 through 1985 was received by the 
State without objection. (R. 676) Each royalty check 
submitted by Trail Mountain from 1979 through 1985 was received 
and cashed by the State without objection. (R. 676) 
The Coal Production and Settlement Transmittals 
received by the State were routinely reviewed by John T. Blake, 
Mineral Resources Specialist, during the period from 1979 
through 1985. (R. 677-678) He made a determination that each 
payment was correct in light of the production. (R. 678) 
In March of 1985, the State undertook an audit of the 
royalty payments of Trail Mountain. (R. 679) The State 
concluded that royalties had not been paid in accordance with 
the terms of the Lease, and that royalties had been underpaid. 
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(R. 679) The State made this same determination in regard to 
all other similar State Coal Leases under which royalties had 
been paid at the rate of 15?f per ton during this same period. 
(R. 680) 
As part of the audit program, an Audit Committee was 
formed to review the audits. (R. 680) The members of the 
Audit Committee had differing views as to whether or not the 
coal lessees had paid the proper royalty amounts under the 
various State Coal Leases; and whether or not the State should 
demand payment of royalties at a higher rate. The Committee, 
however, approved the audit report. (R. 681) 
By letter dated October 15, 1985, the State provided 
Trail Mountain with a copy of the audit, and made demand for 
unpaid royalties, interest, and penalties of $5,222,197.20. 
(R. 681-682) Trail Mountain appealed to the Director of the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Director"), 
disputing the report's conclusions and requesting a 
redetermination of the matter. The Director denied the 
appeal. (R. 683-684) Trail Mountain then filed this action 
seeking declaratory relief against the defendants, and 
challenging the State's demand for retroactive payment of 
royalties. 
This dispute centers on the royalty provision of the 
Lease which requires the lessee: 
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To pay lessor quarterly, on or before the 
15th day of the month succeeding each 
quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15«5 per ton of 
2,000 lbs. of coal produced from the leased 
premises and sold or otherwise disposed of, 
or 
(b) at the rate prevailing at the 
beginning of the quarter for which payment 
is being made, for federal lessees of land 
of similar character under coal leases 
issued by the United States at that time, 
whichever is higher . . . .(R. 665) 
The District Court found that the royalty provision is 
ambiguous, and that the parties construed the provision over 
the years as requiring the payment of royalties at the rate of 
15gi per ton, (R. 653-655) That decision was based upon 
findings that (1) the State accepted royalties at the 15^ per 
ton rate; (R. 251, 792) and, (2) that the State by an 
established course of conduct for many years adopted a 
construction of the Lease that 15^ 5 per ton was the proper 
royalty rate. (R. 655, 793-794) The State claims that during 
the period in question, the federal prevailing rate was 8% of 
sales value, and that Trail Mountain was required to pay 
royalties at that rate. (Appellants' Brief pp. 21, 22) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
L The royalty provision in the Lease is ambiguous 
as a matter of law. Numerous terms and phrases of the royalty 
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provision are susceptible of two or more meanings. The 
provision is incomplete, vague, and is missing essential 
terms. There is no objective standard for application of the 
alternate royalty provision, and the Lease fails to specify the 
rights and duties of the parties in relation thereto. The 
Lease is ambiguous by defendant's own admissions. 
2. The Court should look to the past interpretation 
and course of conduct of the parties in determining how to 
apply the royalty provision. The parties* course of 
performance demonstrates that they construed the Lease as 
requiring payment of royalties at the rate of 15^ per ton. 
3. The State is estopped from retroactively 
assessing royalty other than at the rate of 15<zf per ton. 
4. The State's assertions regarding trust land law 
and policy are inapposite. The trust received the full value 
of royalties provided for in the Lease. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ROYALTY PROVISION IN THE LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS. 
Terms which are susceptible of various meanings render 
a contract ambiguous. Russell v. Valentine, 376 P.2d 548 
(Utah 1962). See also Jones v. Acme Building Products. Inc., 
450 P.2d 743, 746-747 (Utah 1969); Gibbs v. Erbert, 424 P.2d 
276 (Kan. 1967); and 7-G Ranching Company v. Stites, 419 P.2d 
358, 361 (Ariz. App. 1966). 
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A. The Term "rate prevailing" is ambiguous because 
it is susceptible of different meanings. 
Does the "rate prevailing" mean an average of royalty 
rates in various leases, or the rate used in a numerical 
majority of leases? How many leases should be taken into 
account when determining the rate prevailing, and which leases 
should be used to make this determination? 
The Lease also fails to specify who should determine 
the "rate prevailing." Is the State or Trail Mountain 
responsible for calculating the "rate prevailing"? This 
omission renders the term ambiguous because it could be 
interpreted to mean that either or both of the parties was 
responsible for the calculation. 
B. The term "land of similar character" is ambiguous 
because it is susceptible of different meanings. 
The Lease refers to "federal lessees of land of 
similar character." The phrase is ambiguous for two reasons: 
(1) it does not set forth the factors to be considered in 
determining "land of similar character"; and, (2) it does not 
indicate who is responsible for making that determination. 
The Legislative General Counsel has concluded that: 
As used in Article III, SECOND, (c), of the 
attached lease, the term "land of similar 
character" is so vague as to defy reasonable 
definition. Initially the problem becomes 
one of kind, i.e. similar in what 
regard—size, productivity, value. 
Assuming, arguendo, that similarity can be 
established, the second problem arises when 
-8-
it is attempted to establish the magnitude 
of the lands available for comparison i.e. 
does the land have to be similar to land in 
the same county, state, region or is the 
entire United States available for 
comparative similarities. 
Without further explanation in the lease 
itself or without knowing the intent of the 
parties, any definition given herein would 
be totally inconclusive. 
Legislative General Counsel Opinion No. 077-010, April 8, 
1977. (R. 666, 398-399) (emphasis added). 
Representations by the State demonstrate that it was 
uncertain as to the meaning of this term. In an October 4, 
1976 letter from the Division to John L. Bell in response to 
Mr. Bell's questions concerning the royalty provision, the 
Division stated "that the royalty can be changed to the rate 
payable under Federal leases in the same area". (R. 666, 394) 
(emphasis added). There is no authority for the Division's 
assumption that "land of similar character" means land in the 
"same area." 
Approximately one month later, the State admitted that 
it had not made a formal determination of what "land of similar 
character" meant. In a letter dated November 18, 1976 from the 
Division to Mr. Bell, the Division stated that: "The State has 
never made a formal decision on this because we have not yet 
been faced with the problem." (R. 666, 396) In the same 
letter, the Division stated that they "would probably recommend 
to the Land Board that same area be interpreted to mean a 
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particular drainage area . . . ." The letter concluded with the 
caveat, "[h]owever, I should impress that this is only a Staff 
recommendation . . . ." (R. 666, 396) 
Further, since the "rate prevailing" is determined by 
reference to "land of similar character", the ambiguity is 
compounded. 
C. The phrase "coal leases issued by the United 
States at that time" is ambiguous because it is 
susceptible of different meanings. 
The Lease states that royalty should be paid "at the 
rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which 
payment is being made for federal lessees of land of similar 
character under coal leases issued by the United States at that 
time. . . . " (R. 665, 390) The phrase "coal leases issued by 
the United States at that time" could be interpreted to mean 
those leases issued only at the beginning of the quarter, or 
those issued during the quarter, or any previously issued lease 
in existence at the beginning of the quarter. 
D. The Lease is ambiguous by the State's own 
admissions. 
The Director of the Division, Ralph A. Miles, has 
admitted that there was not unanimity of opinion among the 
members of the Division's Audit Committee as to how the royalty 
provision should be interpreted. (R. 533-534, 681) Further, 
Mr. Miles has unequivocally admitted that the royalty 
-10-
provision was ambiguous, and required some interpretation. 
(R. 534) Mr. Miles was the head of the State agency which 
administered these leases during most of the relevant period. 
Donald G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division, 
has stated that he was of the opinion that the 15<zf per ton 
royalty was the proper royalty as of February 17, 1981, the 
date the Lease was assigned to Trail Mountain. (R. 544) 
Mr. Prince also interpreted the Lease to give the Board of 
State Lands the ability to change the royalty rate but only 
prospectively, and not retroactively. (R. 546) Both of these 
interpretations are directly contrary to the State's present 
interpretation. 
John T. Blake, a Mineral Resources Specialist with the 
Division, had responsibility for administering the Trail 
Mountain Lease. (R. 251, 547-548) Mr. Blake believes that the 
15?{ per ton royalty was the proper amount during the period in 
question. (R. 550) He also acknowledges that he has 
a different interpretation of the Lease than the Division now 
supports. (R. 550) In fact, Mr. Blake has stated that the 
royalty provision is ambiguous. (R. 551) 
E. The Lease is ambiguous because it is incomplete, 
vague, missing terms and facially deficient. 
A contract is ambiguous if it is vague and uncertain. 
Winegar v. Smith Investment Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah 1979). The 
Lease is vague, uncertain and incomplete because it does not 
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define critical terms, and fails to provide a mechanism for 
applying the alternate royalty provision. The Lease fails to 
provide any objective standard with respect to: (1) which of 
the two royalty provisions is applicable; (2) what triggers the 
change from one provision to another; (3) when the change from 
one provision to another should be made; (4) which party is 
responsible for determining when a change should be made; (5) 
which party is responsible for determining the "rate 
prevailing"; (6) how the "rate prevailing" should be 
calculated; (7) what "land of similar character" means; and, 
(8) whether a change would be automatic or whether notice is 
required. 
Thus, the royalty provision of the Lease does not 
provide a clear understanding as to each party's rights and 
duties under the contract. 
F. The parties' disagreement itself creates an 
ambiguity. 
The disagreement of the parties concerning the 
interpretation of a contract demonstrates that the contract is 
ambiguous. Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 
743, (Utah 1969). In Acme the Court stated: 
Ordinarily the intention of the parties 
to a written contract must be determined by 
an examination of the writing, but if a 
phrase or a part of a written agreement is 
ambiguous and the intention of the parties 
cannot be determined from the writing 
itself, parol evidence is admissible to show 
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the intention of the contracting 
parties . • . . The disagreement of the 
parties interested clearly shows that the 
contract involved is ambiguous and without 
extrinsic evidence the true intention of the 
parties cannot be determined. 
Id. at 747 n.4, (quoting Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal 
and Irrigation Co., 162 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1945)) (emphasis 
added). 
The question of ambiguity may also be affected by the 
conduct of the parties in interpreting the Lease. This Court 
has stated that: 
[E]ven if it be assumed that the words 
standing alone might mean one thing to the 
members of this court, where the parties 
have demonstrated by their actions and 
performance that to them the contract meant 
something quite different, the meaning and 
intent of the parties should be enforced. 
In such a situation the parties by their 
actions have created the 'ambiguity1 
required to bring the rule into operation. 
Bullough v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965) (quoting 
Crestview Cemetery Association v. Dieden, 356 P.2d 171, 178 
(Cal. I960)) (emphasis added). 
G. The arguments of the State are inapposite. 
The State cites Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1979), for the proposition that the royalty provision is not 
defective since there is a "formula or method to set the 
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price." (Appellants* Brief, p. 20) The Ferris case involved a 
dispute over the amount of commission due the defendant on the 
purchase of a home. Under an oral agreement, the defendant was 
to receive a "fair commission". The defendant had frequently 
asked the plaintiff what he considered to be a "fair 
commission", but the plaintiff failed or refused to say. The 
plaintiff's refusal or failure to cooperate with the defendant 
was key to the court's decision. 
By contrast, the royalty provision defects in the 
instant case are found in the provision itself. Also, due to 
the ambiguous nature of the royalty provision, the "formula or 
method" of calculating the royalty cannot even be determined. 
The District Court found that the formula is "not immediately 
capable of definitive determination." (R.654) Moreover, Trail 
Mountain did not refuse or fail to cooperate with any request 
of the State to establish a reasonable interpretation of the 
royalty provision. 
Even assuming arguendo that the royalty provision is 
not defective due to its ambiguity, the State has not 
established that the proper rate under the alternate royalty 
provision is 8%. The State contends that the royalty provision 
"formula" indicates an 8% royalty rate because the Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 ("FCLAA"), 30 U.S.C. § 201 et 
seg., increased the federal royalty rate to 8% of the value of 
coal produced on federal leases. (Appellants' Brief, p. 21) 
Although the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the FCLAA, 
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set the royalty rate for mining underground coal at 8%, the 
regulations also provide for the reduction of royalty to 5% or 
lower under various circumstances. See 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2 
(1986). As was noted in Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 
816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987), those regulations do not 
"automatically fix" the royalty for all underground coal leases 
at 8%. 
II. THE AMBIGUOUS ROYALTY PROVISION SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARTIES PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION AS 
REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF 15^ PER TON ROYALTY. 
Where the terms of a contract are ambiguous, it is 
well established that courts may look to the interpretation of 
the parties, as evidenced by their course of conduct, to 
construe the contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 274; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979). 
A. Ambiguities in the Lease should be construed 
against the State. 
It is also a well established rule that if there is an 
ambiguity in the language of a contract, the court will 
construe the language against the drafter. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A. v. Midwest Realty and Finance. Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 
1975). The royalty provision of the Lease was written by the 
State for its benefit. A dispute or ambiguity concerning the 
Lease language should be resolved in favor of Trail Mountain 
and against the drafter, the State. 
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B. The alternate royalty provision is not 
self-executing. 
The Lease does not specify who has the duty of 
determining which royalty rate is applicable. Correspondence 
between the State and Trail Mountain from 1976 through 1985 
indicates that the parties interpreted the Lease as requiring a 
15^ per ton royalty until some affirmative action was taken by 
the State to change the royalty. In other words, the parties 
agreed that the change in royalty rates was not 
self-executing. See pp. 27 to 32 for a discussion of relevant 
correspondence. 
There is similar correspondence in the State's files 
for other producing state coal leases indicating that the 
royalty rate would remain at 15^ per ton until the parties 
agreed to a higher prevailing federal rate, or until the 
Division made a determination as to the prevailing federal rate. 
Donald G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division, 
is of the opinion that affirmative action by the State was 
necessary before the 15^ per ton rate would change. (R. 295, 
545) 
The royalty provision could not possibly be 
self-executing when its meaning is not clear on its face. The 
District Court properly held that "sub-paragraph (b) is not 
self-executing as to create a legal obligation on the lessee 
since the identifiable factors necessary for self-execution 
could not independently be ascertained by either party." 
(R. 655) 
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In order to be self-executing, the prevailing federal 
rate would have to be an identifiable figure which could be 
independently ascertained by either party. Thus, the royalty 
could only be changed upon agreement of the parties, or upon 
notice and actual determination by the Division, or through 
appropriate policy making or rulemaking procedures. 
This position is consistent with the holding of two 
Utah cases dealing with real estate contracts. Grow v. Marwick 
Development Company Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. 
Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1976). 
The State contends that the alternate royalty 
provision is self-executing, and that Trail Mountain was 
obliged to determine the prevailing federal rate. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 21) This is an extremely heavy burden to place on 
the coal lessee, who may or may not be familiar with the 
matters involved, or have access to the necessary information. 
Given the fiduciary obligation of the State as trustee 
of its lands, the responsibility to determine the proper 
royalty more appropriately falls upon the State. Officials of 
the Division who were responsible for administering coal leases 
were in a much better position to determine these matters. 
Even these officials, however, have admitted that the royalty 
provision was ambiguous and uncertain of application. 
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C. The State did not take sufficient or positive 
action to establish the construction of the 
ambiguous Lease provision which it now asserts. 
During the nine-year period from 1976 through 1985, 
the State continually represented that the 15?f royalty was 
appropriate and acceptable,2 (R. 417,464, 529-531, 554, 672, 
697) See discussion pp. 27-32. During the period from 1979 
through 1985, the State accepted royalty payments at the 15?$ 
rate without objection. (R. 676) Never once did the State 
indicate that a higher royalty was owing. In fact, the State 
made affirmative representations that the higher royalty would 
only take effect after readjustment of the Lease in 1986. 
(R. 464) 
A somewhat analogous situation was presented to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Rosebud Coal 
Sales Company v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949 (1982). In Rosebud, the 
United States Department of Interior attempted to readjust a 
federal coal lease approximately two and one-half years after 
its readjustment date. The court held that this action was not 
authorized, and that readjustment had to be done in a timely 
manner, stating in part: 
2
 Not only did the State for many years construe the 
royalty provision differently than it now asserts, not one of the 
other five producing lessees with similar royalty provisions 
construed the provision according to the construction which the 
State now asserts. (R. 153, 156, 372-73, 502-03, Plateau Mining 
Company, et al. v. The Utah Division of State Lands, et al. 
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If no action is taken by the Government for 
an extended time it is reasonable to assume 
that a decision was made not to take 
advantage of the opportunity * * * . Thus a_ 
continuation of the old royalty rate and 
other lease provisions can be considered a 
choice then made by the administrators. 
When such a choice was made we find no 
provision in the Act nor in the regulations 
permitting the Department to reverse the 
position it took originally at the 
prescribed time. 
Id. at 952 (emphasis added.) 
This same reasoning applies to the State's attempt to 
retroactively assess Trail Mountain for additional royalties. 
Assuming arguendo that under the Lease, the State had the right 
to assert a higher royalty rate, it chose not to. Perhaps it 
elected not to do so because of the ambiguities in the Lease, 
or perhaps because a determination was made that an increase 
was not economically or otherwise justifiable. The exact 
reason is not relevant. As in Rosebud Hit is reasonable to 
assume that a decision was made not to take advantage of the 
opportunity * * *. Thus, a continuation of the old royalty 
rate and other lease provisions can be considered a choice then 
made by the administrators." Id,, at 952. 
In fact, the Assistant Director of the Division, 
Donald Prince, has stated that this is exactly what happened. 
(R. 400, 540) 
D. The Lease should be construed in accordance 
with the parties' past interpretation and 
course of conduct. 
Where the terms of a contract are ambiguous, courts 
may look to the interpretation of the parties, as evidenced by 
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their course of conduct, to construe the contract. 17 Am. Jur. 
2d, Contracts § 274 (1964). Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 202 (1979). 
"There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, 
than to see what they have done. . . . Parties in such cases 
often claim more, but rarely less, than they are entitled to." 
Insurance Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273 (1877). 
This rule of practical construction is applicable to 
the royalty provisions of mining leases: 
Where the terms of the lease are somewhat 
ambiguous as to the royalties, if the lessee 
pays royalties for some years on a certain 
construction of the terms, it will be 
regarded as the true construction, as 
against him; and, if the lessor accepts 
payment for some years on a particular 
construction of the lease, he cannot 
afterward claim royalties on a different 
construction or theory . . . 
58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals § 186 (1948) (citing to numerous 
cases) (emphasis added). 
Practical construction is given even greater weight 
when the parties' course of conduct occurred before any 
controversy arose. Fanderlik-Locke Co. v. United States, 
285 F.2d 939, 947 (10th Cir. 1960), cert, denied, 365 U.S. 860 
(1961). 
This Court has applied the doctrine of practical 
construction in a number of cases. Zeese v. Estate of Sieoel, 
534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975); Hardinae Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp., 
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266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1954); Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation 
Co. v, Rockv Ford Irr. Co., 61 P.2d 605 (Utah 1936); Roberts v. 
Tuttle, 105 P. 916 (Utah 1909); Woodward v. Edmunds, 57 P. 848 
(Utah 1899). 
The contract language need not be ambiguous on its 
face before the doctrine of practical construction can be 
applied. Where a contract is clear on its face, but the 
parties by their course of conduct have indicated that the 
contract has meant something different to them, the contract is 
to be interpreted according to the construction adopted by the 
parties. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1972); EIE v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 
(Utah 1981). 
The State erroneously asserts that the District Court 
"rewrote" or "deleted" part (b) of the royalty provision in the 
Lease. (Appellants* Brief, p. 23) The District Court did not 
rewrite or delete the ambiguous royalty provision. The 
District Court simply and properly interpreted the provision 
pursuant to an acknowledged rule of construction that courts 
look to the course of conduct of the parties in construing 
ambiguous contracts. 
Case authority involving mineral royalty provisions 
overwhelmingly supports the Judgment of the District Court. 
For example, where the parties to a mining lease had previously 
interpreted the lease consistent with the interpretation being 
advanced by the lessor, the court adopted the lessor's 
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interpretation of the lease. Allen v. Rubv Company, 389 P.2d 
581 (Idaho 1964). 
In Ackerman v. Sterling Paving Company, 497 P.2d 699 
(Colo. App. 1972), the court held that where lessors acquiesced 
in the lessee's construction of an ambiguous mineral lease for 
at least three years, the lessors were bound by such 
interpretation. The court reasoned: 
The evidence clearly supports the trial 
court's finding: 
"That the parties by their conduct 
before the dispute arose, have 
interpreted the Lease in accordance 
with [Sterling's] construction of its 
meaning and that the plaintiffs for 
over three years, . . . have adopted 
defendant's construction of the Lease 
and acquiesced in such construction 
. . . ; that plaintiffs . . . took no 
sufficient or positive action to 
establish their now asserted 
construction of the Lease." 
. . . 
"We conclude that the conduct of the 
parties before the controversy arose, 
acting under the contract, is a 
reliable test of their interpretation 
of the instrument, and whatever the 
stress of subsequent disagreement 
neither in his own interest may be 
heard to urge a different construction." 
Id. at 700-701. 
The same result was also reached in Wiggins v. 
Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, 328 F. Supp. 33 
(M.D. Ga. 1970). 
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In an action by the lessor against the lessee to 
recover additional royalties allegedly due under a gas lease, 
the practical construction of the parties was adopted by the 
Court in Lafitte Co. v. United Fuel Gas Company, 177 F. Supp. 
52 (E.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1960). The 
court reasoned: 
The applicable rule is best expressed by a 
quotation in the opinion in the case of Air 
King Products Company v. Hazeltine Research, 
D.C., 94 F. Supp. 85, 92: 
1
 In Carthage Tissue Paper Mills v. 
Village of Carthage . . . it is said: 
•Practical construction by uniform and 
unquestioned acts from the outset, 
especially when continued for a long 
period of time, is entitled to great, 
if not controlling, weight, for it 
shows how the parties who made the 
contract understood it. If they do not 
know what they meant, who can know? 
Such a construction is presumed to be 
right, because it was made by the 
parties themselves when under the 
influence of conflicting interest. 
This is true whether the construction 
is by contemporaries or their 
successors . . .• 
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). 
In Hall v. Landrum, 470 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. App. 1971), a 
coal lease provided for royalties of 10^ per ton, with an 
annual minimum royalty of $1,200. The lessee suspended payment 
of the minimum royalty, but continued to pay the 10?5 per ton 
royalty for coal actually mined. The lessor demanded 
retroactive payment of the minimum annual royalty. Examining 
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the course of conduct of the parties, the court noted that the 
lessor had made no complaint that the minimum royalty had not 
been paid, and had accepted royalty payments on coal mined at 
10?f per ton. The court ruled that the lessee did not have to 
retroactively pay the minimum royalty. 
In Keefer Coal Co. v. United Electric Coal Cos., 
10 N.E.2d 210 (111. App. 1937), a dispute arose between the 
parties as to the meaning of a coal royalty provision. The 
court found the royalty provision to be ambiguous and looked to 
extrinsic evidence, including the parties' course of conduct, 
to determine their intent. The court noted that the ambiguous 
provision was placed in the lease at the instance of the lessor 
for its benefit, and was drafted by the lessor's attorney. The 
court noted that the contract should therefore be construed 
more strongly against the lessor. The court also found that 
the lessor had represented to the lessee that the lease was to 
be construed as the lessee advocated. 
Similarly, in Prudence Coal Company v. Perkins, 217 F. 
569 (4th Cir. 1914), the court found that where a lessee of 
coal lands paid royalties for ten years under a certain 
construction of a lease which the court found to be somewhat 
ambiguous, such construction would be taken as the true 
construction of the lease. 
Likewise, in City of Philadelphia v. Lehigh Valley 
Coal Co., 138 A. 94 (Pa. 1927), the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that a lessee who had acquiesced to a certain 
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construction of the royalty provision of a coal lease for nine 
years was bound by the construction adopted by the parties. 
From the time the lease went into effect 
until the time when the present dispute 
arose, covering a period of between 9 and 10 
years, . . . defendant continuously, month 
after month, paid in accordance with 
plaintiff's contention . . . without any 
dispute as to plaintiff's alleged right. So 
far as this record shows, neither orally nor 
by writing did defendant, between June 21, 
1916, and the time when the present 
controversy arose, ever challenge the 
accuracy of plaintiff's calculations, made 
in accordance with the agreement set forth 
in the letter of that date, nor, indeed, did 
defendant ever assert that this agreement 
was anything less than an amendment or 
interpretation of the lease itself. For 
these reasons, the uniform construction by 
the parties must prevail, and defendant 
cannot now effectively set up its attempted 
defense. 
Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
In McKeever v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 68 A. 670 (Pa. 
1908), the royalty provision of the coal lease was susceptible 
of two different constructions. The court reasoned as follows: 
The agreement was not carefully drawn so as 
to fix with absolute certainty the exact 
meaning of the parties on the question of 
the payment of the royalties. It is 
susceptible of two different meanings; and, 
if the case stood on the agreement alone, we 
would have some hesitation in reaching a 
conclusion. Whatever doubt has arisen in 
our minds in the consideration of the 
question involved is resolved in favor of 
the appellee, because of the acts of the 
original lessor, who for a long period of 
years accepted payment of the royalties from 
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the lessees on the basis of $300 per acre, 
as determined by actual survey and receipted 
in full for all royalties to the date when 
paid. . . . 
The conclusion is irresistible that the 
original lessor interpreted his own contract 
to mean a sale or leasing, of his coal at an 
amount equivalent to $300 per acre, and for 
a long period of years accepted payment in 
full on this basis. We think the parties 
have construed their own contract, and 
courts will not disturb the rights and 
liabilities arising under the same when 
these things have been definitely determined 
by the contracting parties themselves. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also, Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Searle 
and Stark Heirs. 94 A. 74 (Pa. 1915). 
In accord is Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co., 
228 S.E.2d 139 (W.Va. 1982), in which the lessor, after ten 
years of accepting royalty payments under the lessee's 
interpretation of the coal lease, brought an action to recover 
alleged deficiencies, arguing that the lessee had incorrectly 
interpreted the lease. The court upheld the lessee's 
construction, id. at 146. 
In Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Ingram, 560 F.2d 994, 
988 (10th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 958 (1978), the 
parties' construction of an oil and gas lease royalty provision 
for 30 years was upheld where both parties had knowledge of the 
construction. 
A party who received royalty payments under an oil and 
gas lease for almost eight years was held bound to the parties' 
course of conduct in interpreting the royalty provision, in 
-26-
Kretni Development Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497 
(10th Cir. 1934), cert, denied, 295 U.S. 750 (1935). See also 
Lackey v. Ohio Oil Co., 138 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1943), and 
London Extension Mining Co. v. Ellis, 134 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 
1943) 
E. The parties have consistently interpreted the 
royalty provision as only requiring the payment 
of a 15<zf per ton royalty. 
Beginning in October, 1976, and continuing until 
October, 1985, the Division has repeatedly taken the position 
that the proper royalty under the Lease was 15<zJ per ton, and 
that the royalty would remain 15^ per ton until the Lease was 
readjusted. This is demonstrated by the following documents. 
(1) Letter of October 4, 1976, from C. J. Brinton, 
Economic Geographer for the Division, to John L. Bell. 
(R. 394-395) Mr. Brinton states that the 15^ rate "will be the 
rate until one of two situations which could alter this rate 
occur." First, the royalty can be changed "at such time as the 
Federal lease in question begins production." Second, the 
royalty can change upon readjustment "at the end of each 20 
year period of the lease term." (R. 395) The royalty rate of 
15<zf per ton was not changed when any Federal lease began 
production. Thus, the 15<zf royalty rate was to remain in effect 
until readjustment of the lease terms. 
(2) Letter dated September 4, 1980 from John T. 
Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to 
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Mr. Myron F. Fetterolf. (R. 406) This letter advised 
Mr. Fetterolf that the Trail Mountain Mine was in violation of 
the terms of the Lease due to certain activities at the mine. 
If there was a violation of the Lease due to underpayment of 
royalties, presumably this would also have been asserted by the 
Division. The absence of such an assertion clearly indicates 
that the 15?f per ton royalty rate was acceptable to the 
Division as of 1980. 
(3) Letter dated January 29, 1981, from John T. 
Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to the 
Fetterolf Group (Trail Mountain's predecessor). (R. 412) This 
letter increases the minimum annual royalty under the Lease to 
$1.50 per acre. There is no mention of a possible increase in 
the 15?f per ton production royalty, despite the fact that there 
had been production under the Lease for 1-1/2 years. If the 
Division believed that the production royalty was tied to the 
federal 8% royalty, (which had then been in effect for 
5, years), this was an appropriate time to raise the issue. 
Since the Division declined to do so, there is a strong 
presumption that the 15gf per ton royalty was acceptable to the 
Division. 
(4) Approval of Lease Assignment dated February 17, 
1981. (R. 670, 411) The Division approved the assignment of 
the Lease to Trail Mountain without any notice of a deficiency 
in royalty payments. 
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(5) Letter dated May 8, 1981, from John T. Blake, 
Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to Natomas 
Energy Company (Trail Mountain's Predecessor). (R. 671, 414) 
Mr. Blake states: "Thank you for submitting royalty payments 
for the first quarter for the Trail Mountain Mine. The State 
Land Board does have a form to be used in reporting production 
and royalty which we ask that you use in the future." At this 
time, royalties had been paid at the rate of 15^ per ton for 
the preceding two years. This letter clearly indicates that 
the 15$f rate was still acceptable to the Division, and was 
appropriate under the Lease. 
(6) Telephone conversation in September, 1983 between 
John T. Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, 
and Bruce K. Anderson, Accounting Manager For Trail Mountain. 
(R. 672, 417) In this conversation Mr. Blake represented that 
the royalty under the Lease was 15^ per ton. This was in 
response to Mr. Anderson's attempt to confirm the royalty rate 
since he was then taking over responsibility for making royalty 
payments to the Division. (R. 553) 
(7) Letter dated May 9, 1984 from John T. Blake, 
Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division to Trail Mountain 
Coal Company. (R. 673, 462) By this letter, the Division sent 
a new royalty reporting form to Trail Mountain. Certainly, if 
there was any deficiency in royalties, the Division would have 
also notified Trail Mountain at this time. 
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(8) Several telephone conversations between 1983 and 
1985 between Ervine Allen, Jr., Senior Land Management 
Administrator for Trail Mountain, and (1) John T. Blake, 
Mineral Resources Specialist with the Division, and 
(2) Ralph A. Miles, Director of the Division. In each case, 
these officials confirmed that the correct royalty rate was 
being paid. (R. 303-304, 526-531) 
(9) Interoffice Correspondence dated July 16, 1984, 
from E. Allen, Jr. to R. Ec Garbesi, B. B. Mullins, and J. W. 
Damato of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company. (R. 465) This 
internal memorandum notes that the State of Utah had advised 
the Company that the terms of the Lease would be readjusted, 
and "The production royalty rate, currently 15^ 5 per ton, will 
be increased to 8% of the fair market value." At this point in 
time, based on communications from the State, the Company was 
still under the impression that the proper royalty rate was 15^z5 
per ton. 
(10) Letter dated August 24, 1984, from John T. Blake, 
Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to Trail 
Mountain Coal Company. (R. 697, 464) Mr. Blake states in part 
that "The intended twenty year readjustment will likely raise 
* * * production royalty to 8% of gross value." (R. 464) This 
clearly indicates that (1) production royalty had not then been 
raised to 8% of gross value, and (2) the State did not expect 
Trail Mountain to pay royalties at the 8% rate. This occurred 
8 years after the royalty rate on new federal leases had been 
raised to 8% of value. 
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(11) Notes of a conversation on March 7, 1985, between 
John T. Blake of the Division and Joe Fielder, General Manager 
of Trail Mountain, concerning the twenty-year readjustment. 
(R. 697, 554) These notes indicate that Mr. Blake told Mr. 
Fielder that the 8% royalty would come into effect on 
January 1, 1986, the effective date of the readjustment. This 
confirmed both parties1 understanding that the royalty rate had 
not previously increased to the federal 8% rate; but that it 
remained at 15<zf per ton until the readjustment was effective. 
See (R. 560) Raising the royalty at the 20 year readjustment 
period is similar to the procedure followed with federal coal 
leases. Under federal law, the terms of each federal coal 
lease may be revised or "readjusted" periodically at the 
discretion of the federal government. Generally this occurs 
20 years after the lease is issued, and each 10 years 
thereafter. (R. 686) 
(12) Twenty two Production and Settlement Transmittal 
Forms sent by Trail Mountain and its predecessors to the 
Division during the period from 1979 through 1985, showing that 
royalties were computed at the rate of 15^ per ton. (R. 698, 
418-461) Note that each of these forms contained two columns 
for computations of royalties. One column was based on a cents 
per ton rate, while the other column was based upon a 
percentage rate. In every case, on all 22 forms, the royalty 
was computed using the cents per ton column at the rate of 15?f 
per ton. In every case the percentage column was left blank. 
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The Division has stipulated to the fact that these forms were 
routinely reviewed as they were received to assure that they 
were accurate, (R. 677) The Division's acceptance of the 
forms without questioning the royalty calculation, was a clear 
indication that the 15^ per ton rate had been agreed upon as 
the proper rate. 
(13) Twenty two royalty payment checks received and 
cashed by the Division during the period from 1979 through 
1985. (R. 676, 418-461) In each case the Division sent a 
receipt to Trail Mountain or its predecessors. In no case did 
the Division indicate that there was any question regarding the 
amount of each check. This clearly indicates that the Division 
had agreed to accept 15^ per ton as the royalty on coal 
produced from the Lease. 
The foregoing discussion of the parties* practical 
construction of the royalty provision of the Lease upholds the 
District Court's Judgment, and is dispositive of the State's 
Appeal. 
III. THE STATE IS ESTOPPED FROM RETROACTIVELY ASSESSING 
ROYALTY OTHER THAN AT 15^ PER TON. 
Trail Mountain does not believe it is necessary for 
the Court to determine the estoppel issue. If, however, the 
Court finds that the parties' practical construction is not 
dispositive of the State's Appeal, then Trail Mountain alleges 
that the State should be estopped from now asserting a 
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different interpretation of the Lease and from retroactively 
assessing royalty at a rate other than 15^ per ton. 
In the interest of judicial economy and pursuant to 
Rule 24(i) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Trail 
Mountain adopts by reference pp. 27-53 of the Brief of 
Respondent Plateau Mining Company, regarding the issue of 
estoppel. Trail Mountain, however, wishes to briefly 
supplement the adopted argument with the following points. 
Contrary to the contention of the State, the officers 
of the Division who dealt with Trail Mountain acted within the 
scope of their authority. In fact, these individuals were 
specifically designated by the Division to deal with the 
matters involved. At no time did any of the state officials 
deny that they had the authority to accept royalties at the 
15^ per ton rate. At no time did the state officials indicate 
that the matter had to be decided by higher authority. 
Clearly, if these officials did not have actual authority to 
make the representations they did, they at least had apparent 
authority to do so. 
The State, after supporting the authority of its 
officers to make decisions on royalties payable over a ten year 
period, should now be estopped from denying its officer's 
authority merely because it is in the State's present interest 
to do so. See City of Haileyville v. Smallwood, 441 P.2d 389 
(Okla. 1968); Johnson v. Angle, 341 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Neb. 
1971). 
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Even assuming arguendo that the representations of the 
Division's officers were unauthorized, the State should still 
be estopped in order to prevent manifest injustice. Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979); 
Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) 
(citing United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F 2d 985 (9th Cir. 
1973) and United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 
1975)) . 
Moreover, courts are disposed to apply the doctrine of 
estoppel against a state where the acts or representations are 
merely ultra vires, as opposed to acts or representations which 
are prohibited by statute or are malum in se. Utah State 
University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1982). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE LAW 
REGARDING SCHOOL TRUST LANDS IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT. 
In essence, the State asserts (1) that it had a 
constitutional and moral duty to obtain "full value" from the 
disposition of school trust lands; (2) that the District Court 
"placed impermissible restrictions" on the trust lands; and (3) 
that this Court now has the duty to provide the State with full 
value by enforcing the alternate royalty provision. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 10) 
A. The status of the State as trustee does not alter 
the law of contracts. 
The State carries the trust argument too far. The 
District Court did not restrict the use of the school trust 
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fund in any way; nor did the Court place any restriction on the 
State in contravention of the State Constitution or statutes. 
All the Court did was construe a contract. The fact that the 
State was one of the parties to the contract, does not alter 
the law of contracts. The fact that the State was acting as a 
trustee for the benefit of the school fund, does not alter the 
law of contracts. 
The cases from other jurisdictions cited by the State 
are inapposite. Some of these cases held that the State, as 
trustee, violated its own laws or Constitution (which are 
different from Utah's laws and Constitution). Lassen v. 
Arizona, 385 U.S. 458, 87 S. Ct. 584, 17 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1967) 
held that Arizona must compensate the trust for the full value 
of trust lands it condemned. Utah's Enabling Act and 
Constitution do not contain the language relied upon by the 
Arizona court. Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department, 747 
P.2d 1183, 1195 (Ariz. 1987), held that a disposal of school 
trust lands for less than their appraised value was a violation 
of dispositional restrictions of the Enabling Act. Utah's 
Enabling Act and Constitution impose no such restrictions. 
Oklahoma Education Association v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 
1981), held that school trust assets may not be used to 
subsidize farming and ranching operations, and that 
low-interest loans of trust funds to farmers or low-rental 
leases of trust lands to farmers were unconstitutional. 
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Other cases cited by the State held that the State 
breached its fiduciary duty, which is not alleged in this 
case. County of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 
1984) held that a trustee breached its fiduciary duty by 
disposing of a trust asset without obtaining "the best possible 
price" for the asset. The trustee could not use trust assets 
to pursue other state goals• State v University of Alaska, 624 
P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981), held that inclusion of university lands 
in a state park without compensation was a breach of trust, and 
the university was entitled to compensation. 
Other cases cited by the State merely held that the 
State was not bound by clerical errors. State v. Lamacus, 263 
P.2d 426 (Okla. 1953), affirmed the holding in State v. 
Phillips Petroleum Company that a clerical error in a 
certificate of purchase did not allow the purchaser to receive 
a mineral interest. 
Three cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant. 
State of Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1978), 
only held that the State of Utah was entitled to select "in 
lieu" lands for school land grants that were denied Utah 
because of "federal pre-emption, private entry prior to survey, 
or before title could pass to the state", without regard to 
whether the lands were equal in value or met other 
administrative criteria. Alamo Land and Cattle Company v. 
Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 96 S. Ct. 910, 47 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976), 
held only that a lessee of school trust lands must be 
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compensated when the federal government condemns the land. 
Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont, 
1985) held that absent adequate consideration, the state had no 
power to grant lessees of trust lands permission to develop 
appurtenant water rights. None of these cases goes as far as 
the State attempts to go in this case. 
The State asserts that the District Court "amended" 
the Lease, and then "created" a new contract. Since the new 
contract supposedly limits royalties to 15^ 5 per ton, and 
supposedly deletes the alternate royalty provision, the 
contract "created by the trial court" supposedly violates the 
requirement that the State receive full value for its lands, 
and is therefore "void." (Appellant's brief at p. 18-19). 
This is creative, but it does not stand up to scrutiny. 
The District Court recognized in its Memorandum 
Decision that the alternate royalty provision was still part of 
the Lease. The Court did not amend the Lease or create a new 
Lease. It simply applied principles of contract law to the 
provision; found it to be ambiguous as a matter of law; and 
applied a legal principle of contract construction. 
(R. 654-655) Other principles of law may or may not have also 
been applicable, but the court held, as a matter of law based 
upon extensive stipulated facts, that the parties construed the 
ambiguous provision in a particular way. 
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B. The status of the State as trustee does not alter 
the State's interpretation of the royalty provision 
over a course of years. 
Any loss of trust revenues to the State was not caused 
by the District Court but by the State's original failure to 
draft a usable royalty provision, and the State's own 
interpretation of its royalty language over a course of years. 
The major problem with the State's position is the 
assertion that the Utah courts now have the obligation to 
enforce the alternate royalty provision, even in the face of 
the State's own failure to do so. In other words, since the 
State's officers interpreted and enforced the royalty provision 
over a ten year period in a manner which the State now wishes 
to repudiate, the State attempts to shift the burden of 
enforcement to the courts by arguing that there is a 
constitutional duty to do so. 
The State's duties with respect to school trust lands 
stem from the Utah Enabling Act and the Utah Constitution. 
Section 10 of the Utah Enabling Act provides: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted 
for educational purposes . . . shall 
constitute a permanent school fund, the 
interest of which only shall be expended for 
the support of said schools . . . 
Thus, the Enabling Act simply requires the use of proceeds from 
school trust lands to support the schools. 
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The Utah Constitution, Art- XX, § 1, provides: 
All lands of the State that have been or may 
hereafter be granted to the State by 
Congress . . . are hereby accepted, and 
declared to be public lands of the State; 
and shall be held in trust for the people, 
to be disposed of as may be provided by law, 
for the respective purposes for which they 
have been or may be granted, donated, 
devised or otherwise acquired. 
Thus, the Utah Constitution simply imposes an obligation to 
hold the lands "in trust for the people." 
This case is not one in which the proceeds of school 
trust lands are alleged to have been used for purposes other 
than support of the schools; nor is it a case in which the 
trust status of the lands is being questioned. Therefore, the 
above provisions are not dispositive of any issue in this case. 
Further, the State did receive full value when it 
imposed the alternate royalty provision as part of the Lease 
terms. The Lease was entered into at arm's length, presumably 
after negotiation of acceptable value for each party. The fact 
that the language used by the State was less than artful, and 
that the parties construed it over the years in a particular 
manner, does not mean that less than full value was received by 
the State. 
Thus, there is nothing "unconstitutional" about the 
royalty provision or the manner in which it was construed by 
the parties or the District Court. 
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C. As trustee, the State is required to administer the 
trust estate under the rules of law applicable to 
trustees in general. 
The State is required to administer school trust lands 
subject to the law and rules applicable to the handling of 
trust estates. State Board of Educational Lands and Funds v. 
Jarchow, 362 N.W.2d 19 (Neb. 1985). 
When managing and administering school trust lands, 
the state must comport with the same fiduciary obligations as 
are applied to a private trustee. County of Skamania v. State, 
685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984). 
The State has "considerable discretionary power when 
dealing with the disposition of an interest in land they hold 
in trust for the people . . . ." State v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 
808, 811 (Mont. 1966). The State must necessarily have that 
discretionary power because not every facet of the State's 
administration of the trust can be set out in the statutes or 
constitution. Id. See also United States v. Fenton, 27 
F. Supp. 816 (D.C. Id. 1939). 
Courts "may interfere with the trustees* administration 
of a trust only when it finds an abuse of the trustees* 
discretion or a violation of law.** In re Estate of Bishop, 499 
P.2d 670, 673 (Haw. 1972); see also Miller v. First Hawaiian 
Bank, 604 P.2d 39 (Haw. 1979); In re Trust Estate of Wills, 448 
P.2d 435 (Ariz. App. 1968); Humane Society of Carson City v. 
First Nat'l Bank, 553 P.2d 963 (Nev. 1976). 
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"The reasonable assumption is that discretion vested 
in a trustee should be exercised honestly, fairly and 
reasonably to accomplish the stated purpose of the trust, and 
not in an arbitrary and negative manner to defeat it." In re 
Estate of Wallich, 420 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1966). 
The State raises no inference that it has acted in 
anything other than good faith in fulfilling its obligations as 
trustee of the school lands. Trail Mountain has not alleged or 
implied anything to the contrary. In the absence of 
allegations of abuse of discretion, the presumption must be 
that the State fulfilled its obligation as trustee when it 
received and accepted royalty of 15«£ per ton. 
Even assuming arguendo that the State exceeded its 
authority as trustee when it represented that the royalty was 
15^ per ton and when it accepted the same without protest; a 
third party without actual knowledge that the trustee was 
exceeding its powers or improperly exercising them, is fully 
protected in dealing with the trustee the same as if the 
trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers it 
purported to exercise. 
By statute, Utah protects third persons in dealing 
with trustees. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406 provides as follows: 
With respect to a third person dealing with 
a trustee or assisting a trustee in the 
conduct of a transaction, the existence of 
trust power and their proper exercise by the 
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The 
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third person is not bound to inquire whether 
the trustee has power to act or is properly 
exercising the power; and a third person, 
without actual knowledge that the trustee is 
exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in 
dealing with the trustee as if the trustee 
possessed and properly exercised the powers 
he purports to exercise . . . . 
There have been no allegations that the State has 
exceeded its authority as trustee. In the absence of such 
assertions, the presumption must be that the State was within 
its authority in interpreting the royalty provision as 
requiring payment of royalty at the rate of 15^ per ton. 
The State, citing authority from other jurisdictions, 
asserts that a party leasing school trust lands is charged with 
knowledge of the trust. (Appellants1 Brief, p. 17) Taking the 
State's assertion as true, Trail Mountain's knowledge of the 
trust has no impact on the District Court's Judgment. Pursuant 
to statute, Trail Mountain need not have inquired whether the 
State was properly exercising its authority. Trail Mountain is 
"fully protected" in its dealings with the trustee. 
Finally, even if the Court were to find merit in the 
State's contentions regarding trust land law and policy, a 
higher royalty rate should not be assessed against Trail 
Mountain retroactively. The law should not be applied to work 
a hardship on either a public official or a citizen where both 
have exercised good faith under the law. Oklahoma Education 
Association, Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982). 
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V. AN "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD OF REVIEW IS 
NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, 
The State contends that the issues before this Court 
were decided against Trail Mountain by the Director of State 
Lands, and that the Court cannot override the Director's 
decision unless it is "arbitrary or erroneous." (Appellants1 
Brief, p. 9) 
The District Court has de novo review of an informal 
adjudicative proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. In this 
case, the District Court was reviewing a decision of the 
director at an informal hearing held on July 29, 1986. This 
was a hearing before the same State official whose decision was 
being appealed. (R. 683-684) The State never raised the issue 
of jurisdiction, and did not take any action to have this 
matter heard before this Court rather than the District Court. 
The Director's decision is therefore not entitled to 
deference from this Court. This is especially true of issues 
of law. Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 526 
(Utah 1986). The State concedes that the controlling issues in 
this case are issues of law. (Appellants' Brief, p. 10) 
VI. THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST. 
The District Court, in its Order granting Summary 
Judgment, made certain rulings regarding interest as claimed by 
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the State in its audit report. The Judge held: (1) Interest 
would not begin to accrue except on delinquent payments and 
then only after demand was made; and (2) interest would accrue 
only at the legal rate as provided by statute and not at the 
rate fixed retroactively by board regulation. The State in 
this appeal has not cited error as to these rulings. Inasmuch 
as Appellants are not responding to those matters, it is 
assumed that the Judge's decision is and will be the 
established law of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 1988. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
B y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _ 
Calvin L. Rampton 
Richard Be Johns 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Trail Mountain Coal Company 
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KSJJ; APPENDIX A 
MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION MINERAL LEASE NO. 
GRANT: S c h o o l 
NO. ? 2 6 0 3 
Utah State Lease for 
COAL 
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE AND AGREEMENT entereJ into in duplicate this JLkI» ._ day ol T.^II^iH . 19..JL, 
by and herween the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, heietnafter called the Lessor, and 
• liALCOL-: K. KclURIu;* 
1772 South Mrin Stree t 
Pa It Like C«ty, Utah £/i)0i 
party of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Turtuam to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated. 1953. 
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the covenants to be ohserve4 by the Lessee, as here* 
inafier act forth, does hereby grant and lease to the leasee the exclusive nqhr and privilege to mine, remote, ertd dispne of all of the 
»aid minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in 1% CT* Count-,, State of Utah, towit: 
All of &crtIo:i Ti.i - t : ; -a: : : (3 >, Tnr«.o;r S-ve: ' .utr 0 7 ) Sot : ! . , ilr- ; r 
S i : : ( ) U r . s * , K:.. L / C ; . V I - ' i r . ' . , 
containim: a total of ^**-»Uv# acre-, more or les<, rocether wuh the richt to use and occupy so much of the turfare of tatd land as 
may be required for all purrees resw.ablv incident to the mininc. removal, anr! dupocil cf said mineraK according to the ptuvistom o' rhts 
lea*e, for the ren *d endmt: ttn year* after the first day cf January next suaceJing the date hereof and as lent; there?{'cr a? 'aid minerals ma> 
be rreduced in commercial quantities from vatd lands or Levee «>h:il! continue to mske the pavrnems teemed by Article It! hereof, upon 
condition that at ihe end of each rwenty (10) >ear period succeeding the first day cf the tear in which this lca<* is i».*ted, such readjustment 
of terms and eondmom may be made as the le**»r mav determine to be r>eces<arv in the interest of the St.»rr. 
ARTICLE I 
This lease is granted subrect in all resrects to am! under the conditions of the laws of t**e State of Utah and existing rule* and regulations 
and such operating rules and regulations at ma> be hereafter approved and ndoped by th- State Land Board. 
ARTICLE « 
TIti« tease cr\ers only the mining, removal, and disposal cf the minerals specified in this lease, bur the Lessee shall promptly nenfy the 
the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals extepmg those enumerated herein. 
ARTICLE 111 
The Leasee, in consideration of the grantm*: of the tight* and privileges aforesaid, hereby covenants mnd afree* as follows: 
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land coveted by this lease the vum of fifty (SO) cents per acre per annum. All «uch annual 
pavmenrs of rrntal shall be made in advance <*n the 2nd day of January of each year, except the I 91* J rental which if pat able 
on the execution of this lease. All rentals shall be credited againat royalties for the tear in which they accrue. 
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a 1 at the rate of 13/ per ton of 2000 II*. of OMI produced from the Irased ptemiats and uAd or otherwise disposed of, or 
CM at the_rate prevailing, at the beginnmr? of the qiurter fur which payment is being made, foe federal lestees of land of similar-char-
acter under coallcases issued by the United States at that time, • . _ _ _ 
whichever i» higher, and, commencing with the year brnnnitm the January I following two years from the dztt hereof, to raf annual royalty 
of at least S1.CC multiplied bv the number of acres brtebv leased regardless of actual production, provided that Lessor may, at any time after 
the tenth anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50%. 
Tf the coal produced from the leased premises la wtslted before sate or other disposition b? Lessee, Lessee tna? pay royalty on the washed 
product only, provided Levee maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased preru.es can be 
ascertained and complies with all regulations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on sit washed 
coal originating from the leafed premises. 
THIRD: To prepare arvl forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which 
the material is produced, a citified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and 
such other additional information as the State Land Board may from rime to time require. 
FOURTH: To keep at the mine office clear, accurate and detailed mans on tracing cloth, en • scale not more than 50 feet to the inch, 
of the working* in fiili section of the leased land* and on fhe lands adjacent, «.aid maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land cor* 
ner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such 
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer snd sll maps certified 
to by him. 
FIFTH: Kot to fence or otherwise male inareessihe to stock any watering place on the premises without firsr obtaining the written consent 
of I.essor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic 
or irrigation u«e. 
SIXTH: K.u to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premise*, or any of the rights and privileges 
herein granted, arithout the written consent of the Lessor being first haJ and obtained. 
ARTICLE l\' 
The Lessor hetebr excerr* and reserves from the operation of this lesse: 
FIRST: The richt to rerrr.it for ioint or several use such easements or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may 
be neces«a*v or appropriate t.> the working cf these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits 
or for other use. 
SF.CONP: The rir'*t t--» ««•. le-se, sell, or otherwise di:.pc«e of the surface of said lands or any part thereof, under existing State laws 
or laws hereafter en*.' I, in* ^ f.-.r rs *a».l surface is not necessary for the l.esee in the mining, remov.il, or disposal of the leased substances there-
in, an J to lea** mineral depovr-, c**hcr th-»n those lea-ed herd v. which may be contained in said lands to Ion* as the recovery of such de-
posits does not unreasonably ;ntrrfere with Lessee's ripht* herein granted. 
ARTICLE V 
I 'p>*n frrJw- or irfn ii of the I.e re to at rrp? the readii'-imrnr of term* an I condition* demanded by the I.es'or at the end of an? twenty-
year peri.**!, «uji f. ilnre »•» ref:-s:d shall work a forfeiture of the lease and the same shall be canceled. 
ARTICLE VI 
In ca^ e of txpiraMon. forfeiture, surrender or other trrrrfitirn of tht* lea«e, all uni!ergr»»und timbering supports, shaft lininrr. rail* and 
other jntr.ll.in n- ne:e« •.•:;• I T the v.ipr^rt of m. Ica-rMuvl work inns of any mine-, ami all rails or head frames anJ all installations which 
cannot be rcmrvr.! v.itiiou: t-e-n..-»tirnt in«ury to the pT?mt>?* and all conMnt-tiVn and equipment installed underground ?o provi.le vemil.ition 
for anv nvt-.c . up «n or in rr.-. «:j.l land* sh.tll he and remain a part of the realrv ami shall revert to the Le?*or without further eomideration ot 
CPtnrJii-.vi.o .•»:*.J «hrll be left by fh- I.- <?e in the lands. 
All rer«.«-tvl pr •; cm- of I.*"««ee located within or upon the said land-, an I all huld.no, machinery, equipment and tools (other than fhe 
in• tallati.m* to Sr;":p»* the pr. perrv of l.e .«• »r a ;iK»ve proviiled), shall \y ar.d rt main the property of Lessee and Ler<ee shall h? emitl«rJ to, 
and mav, w:th:n six (• » in^rth* .v'ter mch expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of said leare, or within *uch extension of 
time as mav he gratm-d bv I c»or, remove from the «oid lands su. h rcr5« nal property and improvements, other than ttV»se items which are 
to remain the prop-rtv :f tiir I.e « — as ah>vc provided. 
Le*»ee sh ;!, upon termm-r-n. of thi* Ie:*e or armdonmem of tf:- leaded premise for any reason, seal to Lr*«or's satisfaction all or such 
pan of the mine oper.if.jrs ,n th- prtnire*: as I.e*'.or shall request be sealed. 
ART)CLE VII 
It shal! U th* re* r* •nihility of the Le*>ee to slope the siJr* of all operations of a surface nature to an anple of not les* than 45* or to 
erect a barrier arom-d *r. h operation a' the State Land Roar.! may require. Such slopinr? or fencing shall become a normal part of the opera-
tion of the lease v* »* t.» \r?r
 t .ife uith such operation to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard. 
ARTICLE Vlff 
Lessee «ha!l not «e!l cr otherwt*e d:«r**e of anv wer riphts acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written rtr-
mi««ion. \J\\*n termination of this lease for any rea«on. all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall revert to the 
Lessor as an appirtenance fo the lea«ed premises, and all such rir.hfs acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase 
at Le«*ee's acquisi'inn com, ptwidtd that Lessor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it does not accept the same within thirty 
days after receipt thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, snd obligations in this lesse contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
and assigns of the Lessee. 
ARTICLE X 
Lessee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor »nd upon payment of all 
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable tc the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preser-
vation of the wnrkmrt in such order and condition as to permit of the continued operation of the leased premises. 
ARTICLE XI 
Lessor, its n{ftce*<. and acenu, shall have the tight at ail times to go in and upon the leased lands and premises, during the term of said 
lease to inspect th* worl: done ami the pt^ Krers thereof on said lands and the ptoducts obtained therefrom, and to post any notices on the 
said land that it may iletm fit and proper; and also shall permit any authorized representatives of the Lessor to examine all books and records 
pertaining to operations under this lea«-e, »ru.l to male copies of and extracts from the same, if desired. 
ARTICLE Xtt 
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that In the event the State Is hereafter divested of such 
title, fhe Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained by fhe Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entited to or claim any refund of rentals 
or royalties or other monies theretofcre paid to the Lessor. 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE LAND BOARD 
/ DKECTOfl 
:'^«AJ £<<r--teSfrk&'-' 
- ^ , 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ J ^ ^ ? * ^ -
LESSEE 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
} ss. LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
COUNTY OF I 
% 
On the J»v of 19 , personally appeared beforr me .. .. 
the sicner of rhe above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that — executed the same. 
Given under my hanJ and seal this day of ~ -... 19........ 
My ecmmt*-'t*n Expires: Kotary Public, rerirfmj; at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF ) LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
On the - day of 19 , personally uproar?J More me , 
who brin? duly sworn did siy that he is an officer of - _ — -... anJ that sad instrument was signeJ 
in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Beard of Directors, and said « acknowl-
edged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of — 1 9 _ 
My commission Expires: Notary Public, residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE J "*" 
On the ..JM .. dav of .. . / - ' . *J^...A 19..'....:., personally apprarrd brforr inr Max C. Gardner, who bring by me duly sworn 
did MV that he it the Dirrctor of thr Statr Land Board of the Statr of Utah and that said instrument was signed in brhaif of laid Board by 
resolution of the Board, and uid Ma* C. Gardner at knowlrdftrd to me that said Board executed the same in behalf of the Sute of Utah. 
Given under my hand and teal thia * day of ,., *~j/.J./.*'i \ V/f, 19^.^1 
My eommiaaioo Expires: Notary Public, nrsidinf or: \ y 
Hi 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH MILES, 
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE 
UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 4847 
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial summary 
judgment and has supported the same by the stipulated facts as 
set forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and other supporting 
affidavits, and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points 
and Authorities. The defendants have objected to the Motion and 
have filed their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
have submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities. 
The defendants have objected to the publication of 
certain depositions requested by the plaintiff and referred to 
by the plaintiff in their Memorandum. The Court finds that the 
Motion is well taken and will not order publication of the 
depositions at this time, and will not consider any of the 
matters referred to in the deposition in the disposition of 
these motions. 
The Court finds that there is no dispute as to the 
material facts in this case and has concluded therefrom that 
the plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment as prayed 
for and grants the plaintiff's motion. 
The Court has further concluded that the defendants 
are not entitled to partial summary judgment and denies their 
motion. 
The factual situation is nearly identical to the fact 
situation as shown in Carbon County Case No. 14890, Plateau 
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, 
et al. , and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion 
in that case to show the reasoning of the Court, and the legal 
analysis used by the Court, in reaching its decision in this 
case. . 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to prepare 
a formal judgment in accordance with this decision. 
DATED this / / ^ day of April, 1988. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct 
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION by depositing 
the sane in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
followina: 
Clark 3. Allred 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
David L. Wilkinson 
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
David S. Christensen 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Calvin L. Ranpton 
Richard 3. Johns 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys at Law 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DATED this day of April, 1988 
Secretary 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, and 
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND i 
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF ] 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ) 
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, ) 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ', 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ) 
RESOURCES, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 14890 
The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from 
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the 
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should 
be construed in light of the parties course of performance; 
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal 
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after 
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the 
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the 
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy 
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped 
from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the 
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and 
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their 
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted 
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State 
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally 
enforced. 
The defendants have objected to the granting of the 
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment 
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining 
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on 
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period; 
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes 
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the 
3oard of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff, 
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties 
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board. 
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums 
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court 
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered 
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February 
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on 
the Motions as hereinafter stated. 
Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part, 
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective 
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of 
those undisputed facts. There is no dispute as to the fact 
that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest 
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the 
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the 
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15, 
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows: 
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on 
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, 
royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of 
land of similar cnaracter under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher. . . ." 
That the lease was on a standard form provided by 
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the 
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in 
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form 
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the 
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C 
per ton. The payment was received and retained by the State 
without question or objection throughout the audit period and 
The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah 
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has 
two columns. One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed 
Percentage Basis. Plateau and their predecessors in interest 
filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of 
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15c per ton and 
left the other column blank. 
After the term of the lease had expired, December 
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook, 
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments. The 
audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was 
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of 
1985. 
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal 
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on 
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed. Based upon 
the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the 
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent 
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales 
Value of coal removed. 
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the 
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the 
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose 
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of 
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the state, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty 
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of 
the lease is ambiguous. 
The royalty provision is divided into two parts. 
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive 
determination and provides for 15c per ton on coal produced 
from the leased premises. 
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several 
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination. 
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and 
provided as from what is stated. In other words, at the 
beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing 
federal rat<=> and who makes that determination, the lessor or 
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a 
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is 
it prevalent? Who makes the determination that the land in the 
State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in 
character and what is the basis for determining similarity? 
What tine period is used to determine federal leases "issued... 
at that time" and who makes that determination? Even if a 
prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the 
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation 
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in 
his assessment, and who makes that determination? 
For these reasons, the Court has concluded that 
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal 
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors 
necessary for self-execution could not independently be 
ascertained by either party. 
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its 
oenefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require 
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of 
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a 
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of 
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment. 
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to 
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease 
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty 
under sub-paragraph (a). 
Since the State by an established course of conduct 
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that 
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a 
different construction of the Lease where they took no 
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted 
construction to an ambiguous lease provision. 
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not 
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further 
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ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will 
be, the Court will address other issues presented. 
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of 
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the 
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a 
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State 
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual. 
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the 
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon 
the 8% of value figure. The undisputed facts show that the 
State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article ill of their own Lease and were made aware by the 
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in 
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving 
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the 
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based 
upon 15c a ton. If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were 
going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did 
not do. By their conduct and failure to perform this duty, 
they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the 
acceptable royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon, 
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not 
have done had they known that the defendants were going to 
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insist upon the 8% of value provision. The great injustice 
that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants 
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record 
shows that to allow the irposition of the greater royalty, the 
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity 
under the State Lease. 
Even if the concljsior. is reached that the defendants 
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be 
estopped from asserting the ne* royalty rate. No substantial 
adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants 
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty 
retroactively. The State can still proceed to lease coal lands 
on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State 
the maximum return. They still have the power to revise the 
wording of their coal leases to c: away with any ambiguity and 
to carry out any legally established policy. 
Further, the record sr.ows that the plaintiffs would 
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on 
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the 
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty 
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would 
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result. 
The Court further finds that the State had no right 
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent 
payments at the legal rate, or any penalty. A legally binding 
lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations 
adopted subsequently. 
The Lease does state that it is subject to such 
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved 
and adopted. Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean 
changes to or additions of monetary payment. "Operating Rules" 
has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical 
interpretation. Since the amount claimed by the State is not 
subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be 
due could not commence to run until demand is made. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for 
and denies defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this ^ / j . , Of February, 1988. 
5? 
/ ^ BOYD BtfNNELL, I^t:rict Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I mailed true and correct 
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing the same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Utah State Attorney General 
David S. Christensen 
Assistant Attorney General 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
James L. Elegante 
Patricia J. winmill 
Lucy B. Jenkins 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys at Law 
1985 South State Street, 
Suite 700 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Clark B. Allred 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Calvin L. Rampton 
Richard B. Johns 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys at Law 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DATED this _2 day of February, 1988. 
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APPENDIX C 
Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682) 
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: , (801) 521-3200 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; 
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE 
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 4847 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff, having moved for Partial Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court 
having considered the Uncontroverted Facts and Exhibits as set 
forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and having considered each 
party's Memoranda of Legal Points and Authorities, and now 
being well advised in the premises, hereby enters its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Uncontroverted Facts set forth in the Pre-trial 
Order are accepted by the Court as established for purposes of 
this case. Based upon said Pre-trial Order the Court makes the 
following findings of fact: 
1. Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors 
in interest mined coal under State Mineral Lease No. 22603 (the 
HLeaseM) during the period from 1979 through 1985. 
2. The Lease was on a standard form prepared by the 
State Land Board. 
3. Article III of the Lease provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The Lessee, in consideration of the 
granting of the rights and privileges 
aforesaid, hereby covenants and agrees as 
follows: 
SECOND:. To pay Lessor quarterly, on or 
before the 15th day of the month succeeding 
each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15?f per ton of 
2,000 lbs. of coal produced from the 
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leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the 
beginning of the quarter for which 
payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar character 
under coal leases issued by the United 
States at that time, 
whichever is higher, . . . 
4. The state provided Trail Mountain Coal Company 
and its predecessors with a form for reporting coal production 
and royalties under the lease. The form has two columns for 
calculating royalties. One column is headed <zf/T Basis and the 
other is headed Percentage Basis. 
5. Throughout the period of mining, Trail Mountain 
Coal Company and its predecessors filed the reporting form on a 
quarterly basis with the State of Utah. Trail Mountain Coal 
Company and its predecessors calculated royalties by filling in 
the column on the form labeled cf/Ton Basis, and paid the amount 
of royalty shown to be due under that column at 15«f per ton of 
coal produced. The other column, labeled Percentage Basis, was 
left blank on each form. 
6. Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors 
made royalty payments to the State of Utah for each quarter of 
the years 1979 through 1985 during which coal was produced, on 
the basis of 15«d per ton, as calculated on the reporting form. 
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7. Each reporting form and each royalty payment was 
received and retained by the State without question or 
objection. 
8. At various times prior to and during the period 
of mining, there was written and verbal correspondence between 
the State of Utah and Trail Mountain Coal Company or its 
predecessors, regarding the royalty provision of the Lease and 
the amounts payable thereunder. 
9. The conduct of the Lessor and the Lessees under 
the Lease over a period of years shows that they chose not to 
.apply subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision, and to 
calculate the royalty under subparagraph (a). 
10. In approximately March of 1985, the State 
undertook, for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments. 
11. On or about October 15, 1985, the State provided 
Trail Mountain Coal Company with a copy of the royalty audit, 
and demanded payment for royalties it alleged to be delinquent. 
12. It was the conclusion of the audit that Trail 
Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors should have been 
paying royalties at the rate of 8% of the value of coal 
removed. Based upon the audit, the State made demand upon 
Trail Mountain Coal Company for the payment of an additional 
$5,222,197.20 for delinquent royalties, interest and penalties. 
13. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court now enters its Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The royalty provision contained in Article III, 
subparagraph (b) of the Lease, is ambiguous. 
2. Ambiguities in the Lease should be construed 
against the State. 
3. The alternate royalty provision of subparagraph 
(b) of the Lease is not self-executing so as to create a legal 
obligation on the Lessee. 
4. Some affirmative action on the State's part other 
than a retroactive audit was required to bring the alternate 
royalty provision into an enforceable position. 
5. The Lease should be enforced in accordance with 
the parties interpretation and course of conduct. 
6. Since the parties, by an established course of 
conduct for many years, and by their interpretation of the 
Lease, adopted a construction of the Lease that provided for 
payment of royalties at the rate of 15^ 5 per ton, the State is 
now precluded from asserting a different construction of the 
Lease retroactively. 
-5-
7. Since the State took no sufficient or positive 
action to establish the construction of the ambiguous Lease 
provision which the State now asserts, the State is precluded 
from doing so retroactively. 
8. The above Conclusions of Law are sufficient to 
support a judgment granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Although it is not necessary for the Court 
to go further, the Court also makes the following Conclusions 
of Law. 
9. The State acted in a proprietary capacity in 
entering into the Lease. 
10. The doctrine of estoppel may be applied against 
the State. 
11. The State is estopped from demanding and 
collecting royalty payments for coal mined under the Lease in 
any amount greater than 15$$ per ton for the period from 1979 
through 1985. 
12. The State had no right under the Lease to impose 
interest, except on delinquent payments of the 15<zf per ton 
royalty at the legal rate, or any penalty. 
13. Any interest that may be due on delinquent 
payments does not commence to run until demand is made. 
-6-
14. There is no dispute as to the material facts in 
this case/ and plaintiff is entitled to Partial Summary 
Judgment as prayed for. 
*? /? 
DATED t h i 
'7 x /
is _t^z2liay of /sAfA>r?'f. 1988. 
/^Boyd)Bunnell/ Drs-tfict Judge 
/ 
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APPENDIX D 
Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682) 
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; 
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE 
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 4847 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
Plaintiff having moved for Partial Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court 
having issued its decision granting the Motion of plaintiff and 
denying the Motion of defendants, and good and sufficient cause 
appearing therefore, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES: 
1. Defendants are not entitled to recover from 
plaintiff any royalty amounts calculated at any rate higher 
than 15d per ion of coal produced from Stare Coal Lease 
No. ML-22603 during the period from 1979 through 1985. 
2. Interest due on any delinquent royalties payable 
under State Coal Lease No. ML-22603 only begins to accrue when 
demand for payment of the delinquent royalties is made, and 
then accrues at the statutory legal rate of interest. 
3. The parties hereto shall bear their respective 
costs and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this 3rd day of August 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ BOYD BUNNELL 
Boyd Bunnell 
District Judge 
0851j 
DLJ 
APPENDIX. E 
LEGISLATIVE CENEAAL COUNSEL 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE 
OPINION NO. 077-011) 
Data: April I, 1977 
Subjact: Royalty on Stata Coal Leases 
Requested by: Lennis Knighton 
Lagislativa Auditor Ganaral 
Opinion by: Stavan W. Allred 
Staff Attorney 
Offica of Lagislativa Canaral Counsel 
Conclusion: 1* •Prevailing prica" means "market price;" 
2. "Leases Issued" im£%z% to currently issue 
leases; 
3. "Land of similar character" is sufficiently 
vague to defy definition; and 
4. The state poMB%%%%% the authority to increase 
the royalty on coal leases to a level equal to the current rate 
of federal leases. 
ANALYSIS 
1. As used in Article III, SECOND, (c) , of the attached 
lease, the term "prevailing price" means the market price or the 
price generally prevailing in the locality for similar production. 
The prevailing price is a price set in the usual course of business, 
without undue enlargement of costs and with a reasonable profit. 
2. As used in Article Z2I, SECOND, (c), of the attached 
lease, the term "leases issued" refers those leases issued "at 
the time" that the royalty payments are due. Since those pay-
ments are due monthly, it is reasonable to believe that the 
leases referred to are leases currently issued. 
3. As used in Article XII, SECOND, (c), of the attached 
lease, the term "land of similar eharaeter" is so vague as to > 
defy reasonable definition. / Initially the problem becomes one 
of kind, i.e. similar in what regard — sixe, productivity, value. 
Assuming, arguendo* th*e simllA^lty ean.bi •fc«611«htd, 
the second problem arises when it is attempted to establish 
the magnitude of the lands available for comparison i.e. doVfc 
the land have to be similar to Jand in the same cbunty, state, 
region or is the entire United States available for eoaparitive 
similarities. 
Without further explanation in the lease itself or withou 
knowing the intent of the parties, *ny definition given herein 
would be totally inconclusive. 
4. The state has, pursuant to Article 211, SECOND, (c) 
the authority to increase the royalty rate to a level equal to 
the current federal rate. The three rate structures set in 
Article XII, SECOND, are alternative rates end it should be 
noted that (c) specifically indicates that the lessor shall pay 
whichever rate is higher. 
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